Klamath Basin Fishes:
Argument is No Substitute for Evidence
Cooperman and Markle (2003, this issue) have unfavorably reviewed an
Interim Report prepared by the National Research Council’s Committee on
Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin (NRC 2002).
Their review relates to the committee’s treatment of a Biological
Assessment prepared by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBOR) in 2001 and
a Biological Opinion prepared by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS) in 2001 for the shortnose (Chasmistes brevirostris) and
Lost River suckers (Deltistes luxatus) of the Klamath basin. Both
the Biological Assessment and the Biological Opinion focus on potential
effects of the USBOR’s Klamath Project on the endangered suckers.
The NRC committee currently is working on its Final Report, which is
scheduled for release in 2003. The committee’s Final Report will extend
beyond the operation of the Klamath Project to consider all factors that
might be relevant to the future welfare of the endangered suckers. Because
the Final Report is not finished, the present response to the article by
Cooperman and Markle deals only with the Interim Report. Members of the
NRC committee are William M. Lewis, Jr., chair, University of Colorado;
Richard M. Adams, Oregon State University; Ellis B. Cowling, North
Carolina State University; Eugene S. Helfman, University of Georgia;
Charles D. D. Howard, consulting engineer; Robert J. Huggett, Michigan
State University; Nancy E. Langston, University of Wisconsin; Jeffrey F.
Mount, University of California—Davis; Peter B. Moyle, University of
California—Davis; Tammy J. Newcomb, University of Michigan; Michael L.
Pace, Institute for Ecosystem Studies; and J. B. Ruhl, Florida State
University.
Competence of the Committee
Cooperman and Markle argue that the members of the NRC committee could
not have reached ameaningful understanding of the scientific issues
surrounding the endangered suckers over the few months during which they
studied written documentation and heard oral presentations byresearchers
and others. Although required to produce an Interim Report on a schedule
dictated by its statement of task, the NRC committee had the option of
equivocating on key issues in the event that it could not reach any strong
conclusions during the first few months of its work. Instead, the
committee voluntarily and unanimously reached several strong conclusions
because it was confident that the evidence presented to it supported these
conclusions.
The NRC committee gave its conclusions in the Interim Report with two
important qualifications. First, the committee noted that it would take
into account any new evidence that might become available prior to release
of its Final Report. The committee also emphasized that its evaluation was
of the quality of scientific information available to support certain
conclusions in the Biological Assessment (USBOR 2001) and Biological
Opinion (USFWS 2001). Thus, the committee’s finding of weak scientific
support for any particular hypothesis or proposition in these documents
does not constitute a denial on the part of the committee that such a
theory or proposition ultimately could be supported scientifically by
further study.
Cooperman and Markle suggest that scientists who work the longest on a
problem should have the last word in evaluating information related to the
problem. If so, the entire peer review system for science in the United
States and elsewhere is flawed in that those who report results usually
have more immediate knowledge of and longer experience with their own
project or site than do those who review their work. The point of peer
review is to introduce forms of criticism or independent evaluation that
are not always achievable by those who are working closest to a project;
this was the purpose of the NRC committee. The committee rejects the
notion that the main issues of importance in the Klamath basin are so
complex that they can be evaluated only by insiders.
External peer review has been minimal for work relevant to the
endangered suckers of the Klamath basin. Very little of the scientific
work underlying the Biological Opinion on endangered suckers of the
Klamath basin has passed through a review of the type that accompanies
publication in the primary literature; most of this information resides
inreports or data files. Given the importance of the issues at hand in the
Klamath basin, external review seems likely to be beneficial.
Cooperman and Markle illustrate their doubt about the competence of the
committee to evaluate data on listed fishes by referencing a verbal error
made by the NRC committee’s chair. The chair does not recall referencing
the long nose sucker in place of the Lost River sucker in an oral
presentation, but admit to a certain fallibility of this type. The chair
even admits to having sometimes mixed up the names of his two retrievers
at the end of a long day, but also note that he is aware of the distinct
identities of these creatures.
The NRC Interim Report Criticisms offered by Cooperman and Markle of
the NRC committee’s Interim Report fall into several categories. Many are
trivial in the sense that their resolution one way or the other would not
in any way affect the final conclusions of the NRC committee. Because
these sorts of trivial complaints are about as significant as the errors
that Cooperman and Markle made in reporting the name of the NRC committee
or in failing to understand distinctions between singular and plural uses
of the noun "alga," they are not dealt with here. More important is the
serious and pervasive misrepresentation of the committee’s task and
methods of work. This topic deserves some attention here.
Finally, there are some substantive issues, when removed from the
misleading context in which Cooperman and Markle have portrayed them, that
deserve discussion from the scientific perspective. The Nature of the
Committee’s Work Cooperman and Markle repeatedly state or simply that the
NRC committee presented theories or models of its own in contradiction to
those of the federal agencies. The committee did no such work in preparing
the Interim Report. The committee’s charge, which appears verbatim in the
report (NRC 2002), was to examine the strength of scientific evidence
underlying various components of the Biological Assessment and Biological
Opinion relevant to the endangered suckers. Thus, the committee went about
its work by asking exactly what the underlying strength of scientific
support might be for each significant element of these documents. The
report is a presentation of the committee’s analyses and interpretation of
the data.
In carrying out its task, which not only guided but also constrained
its work, the NRC committee had different objectives than did the USFWS in
writing its Biological Opinion. The Biological Opinion prepared by the
USFWS in 2001 in fact is an exemplary, exhaustive treatment of information
of relevance to the requirements of the endangered suckers, and contains
proposals framed in terms of risk reduction for revised operations of the
Klamath Project. One of these proposals was for maintenance of higher
water levels in Upper Klamath Lake. The USFWS honestly and bluntly stated
in its Biological Opinion, however, that the record of study provides no
evidence for connections between water level in Upper Klamath Lake, which
could be adjusted through modification of Klamath Project operations, and
water quality or fish mortality.
The NRC committee and the USFWS reached a similar conclusion in this
regard, but the committee and the USFWS made different uses of the
conclusion because of differences in their missions. In discharging its
functions as protector of endangered species, the USFWS elected to give
considerable weight to the possibility that harm could come to the
endangered suckers as a result of water levels within the lower range of
observed water levels over the last decade or more. This conclusion was
based on professional judgment involving risks that were not quantified or
that involve harmful effects not yet mechanistically connected to water
level.
The NRC committee, in contrast, was asked to make an evaluation of the
scientific basis for proposals by the USFWS. Professional judgment is
useful but not scientifically rigorous, as it is drawn from generalities
rather than information specific to a particular site. Thus, opinions
based mostly or entirely on professional judgment were viewed by the
committee as weakly supported or, when contradicted by site-specific data,
as unsupported.
The use of professional judgment could be viewed by some observers as
inadmissible for agencies administering the Endangered Species Act. The
NRC committee might appear to endorse this viewpoint by finding
professional judgment as applied by the USFWS to water levels of Upper
Klamath Lake to be scientifically unsupported. The committee was merely
following its task, however; it was not constructing an indictment against
use of professional judgment. Indeed, professional judgment is the
constant companion of applied science. It is commonplace in medicine, even
when the stakes are very high indeed. Thus there is no reason to expect it
to be absent from applied science of the environment.
The extent to which professional judgment can be used in avoidance of
risk to endangered species is a question of policy. Because the USFWS or
any other agency charged with administering the Endangered Species Act
will be faulted greatly for errors of omission in protecting species, it
is obvious that professional judgment will be used extensively by these
agencies to minimize risk of error leading to decline of species. Where
the economic stakes are high, however, it is useful for all parties to
recognize which components of Biological Opinions are indeed
scientifically solid and which are to varying degrees based on informed
speculation.
Thus, in concluding that there is no scientifically-sound support for
the maintenance of specific water levels in Upper Klamath Lake proposed by
the USFWS, the NRC committee was not
stating that the USFWS was derelict in its duties under the Endangered
Species Act. A comparison of the final opinions of the USFWS and the NRC
committee in this case exposes an unavoidable conundrum that is well known
to those who are familiar with implementation of the Endangered Species
Act: policies that are intended to reduce risk may be scientifically weak
or even in contradiction to available evidence. No policy or law has yet
been developed for resolution of this practical difficulty that agencies
face in implementing the Endangered
Species Act.
Cooperman and Markle comment specifically on the committee’s apparent
unawareness of the USFWS’s duty to minimize risk. On the contrary, as
explained above, the committee was well aware of these duties, but an
assessment of risk was not part of the committee’s charge. Thus, a
hypothesis favoring recovery of a fish species at a given site could be
weakly supported or even unsupported scientifically at a particular site,
and yet be recommended by the USFWS as prudent based on general knowledge
of the behavior, physiology, or other characteristics of fish. A greater
difficulty comes with judgments based on the idea of prudence that are in
contradiction with information from the field at a particular site, as is
the interesting case for the welfare of endangered suckers in relation to
water level in Upper Klamath Lake.
One additional misleading aspect of the article by Cooperman and Markle
is that it fails to acknowledge the committee’s finding that most of the
specific recommendations made by the USFWS in its Biological Opinion of
2001 were scientifically sound based on observations and research. While
the recommendation for specific water levels in Upper Klamath Lake has
received much attention because of its economic and sociopolitical
implications, it is not necessarily the most important component of the
reasonable and prudent alternatives proposed by the USFWS.
Specific Scientific Issues: Cooperman and Markle comment
on the abundance of the two populations of endangered suckers in Upper
Klamath Lake. They suggest, quite absurdly, that the NRC committee held
the covert opinion that the populations are recovering. The section of the
committee’s Interim Report on population size is merely a presentation of
background material distilled from the USFWS Biological Opinion (2001) and
documents cited therein. Only a few facts about population sizes for Upper
Klamath Lake are evident from the data, and these seem to be
uncontroversial on all sides: (1) the populations once were very large and
now are much smaller, (2) exact or even approximate sizes of the
populations now and in the recent past are unknown, (3) the number of
large fish in the population episodically has been reduced significantly
by mass mortality, and (4) recruitment to the larger sizes is known to
have occurred since the late 1980s, but the balance between this
recruitment and loss of large fish to mass mortality is unknown.
None of this is new and, contrary to the indication of Cooperman and
Markle, it was not used in any sort of model or theory by the NRC
committee. Most importantly, the committee did not use any novel
assumptions about population sizes or changes in population sizes of the
suckers in reaching its conclusions. The committee took as given the
general basis for federal listing of the suckers, i.e., they are of such
low abundance relative to earlier times and show such evidence of stress
and failure to thrive, particularly in Upper Klamath Lake, that measures
must be taken to create better conditions for them. Thus, the point of
departure for the committee in reaching its conclusions was an evaluation
of various proposals to create better conditions for the suckers leading
to an increase in the size and vigor of their populations.
The NRC committee used a portion of a histogram showing the age
distribution of fish in fish kills (NRC 2002, Figure 5). Cooperman and
Markle suggest that the committee had some motive for truncating this
distribution so as to feature years after 1987, when the fishery was
closed. The caption of the figure indicates that the histogram was
truncated; it is clear from the associated text that the focus was on the
1990s because the committee was interested in comparing age-classes of
fish with coincident environmental data, which were not available for
earlier years. Contrary to what Cooperman and Markle indicate, the
committee was merely setting the stage for comparison of year-class
strength with water quality conditions and water levels over the period of
environmental data collection in Upper Klamath Lake.
Cooperman and Markle take issue with the committee’s empirical tests of
the hypotheses of underlying relationships between water level and the
relevant population data on suckers (year-class strength, relative
abundance of larvae and juveniles) and water-quality variables that are
considered directly or indirectly threatening to the welfare of suckers
(extremes of pH, dissolved oxygen, chlorophyll a).
Cooperman and Markle characterize the committee’s examination of these
relationships as a search for linear correlations. The committee did not
do any correlation analyses. Indeed, an examination of all plots of this
type showed no hint of any relationship, be it linear, log-arithmic,
stepwise, or otherwise. The committee did not rule out the possibility
that relationships exist, but could say with certainty that the data,
which are considerable in some instances, simply do not support the
existence of relationships between water level and indicators of the
abundance or welfare of fish. These conclusions were not unique to the NRC
committee.
As acknowledged by Cooperman and Markle, the USFWS was straightforward
in declaring the absence of any such relationships, as were the
limnologists who made a detailed examination of water quality data (Welch
and Burke 2001). Clearly both of these parties would have had an easier
task in defending proposed adjustment of water levels for the welfare of
the fish had they neglected to comment on the absence of relationships; it
is a credit to their professional integrity that they did so. In
continuing to advocate higher water levels in Upper Klamath Lake in the
face of this information, however, the USFWS scientists were making
recommendations unsupported by and even contradictory to scientific
information, i.e., based on speculation in a doubt-less well-meaning
attempt to reduce risk to the fish.
Cooperman and Markle have alluded to the fact that complex factors
might underlie relationships between water level and other variables
involving the welfare of fish. For example, particular combinations of
water level and weather conditions might be especially bad for fish. In
fact, variations of weather conditions from year to year do seem to
underlie variations in mass mortality of adult suckers from year to year,
but there is no hint of any connection with water level. One could go even
further in invoking complexity by suggesting that the importance of water
level is not evident because it is governed by a large suite of other
variables. Thus, the relationships could be understood only by a very
large data set. While this could be true, it begins to look like an
attempt to salvage a hypothesis rather than to test it, as required by
standard scientific practice. Furthermore, when converted into a
management recommendation, a complex relationship such as the hypothetical
one referred to by Cooperman and Markle would appear to be of little use.
For example, one might tell the water manager to hold the water level high
but not to expect any beneficial result because the effects of holding the
water level high are only hypothetical and in any event are conditional
upon a complex of other factors that cannot be controlled or predicted.
More likely the key to mortality and hardships of suckers lies
elsewhere. Contrary to claims by Cooperman and Markle, the committee was
well aware that fry are associated with shallow water and with macrophytic
vegetation, and that both of these habitat features are influenced in
extent by variations in water level in Upper Klamath Lake. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that variations in the amount of this habitat
are sufficient to influence the welfare of fry. In fact, extensive
sampling of fry between 1995 and 2000 by Markle and colleagues has shown
no indication of any relationship between water level and abundance of fry
(Figure 1). Thus, while shallow water and its vegetation constitute
habitat, variations in this habitat in response to water level do not
appear to be a key factor in controlling the abundance of fry. Cooperman
and Markle seem to be suggesting that the extent of marginal lake habitat
for the fry must be maximized even if such an action does not result in
greater abundance of fry. This stance certainly is possible under the
breadth of policies available to the USFWS through the ESA, but it has
little scientific credibility in terms of promoting the welfare of the
species.
Cooperman and Markle also object to conclusions about the welfare of
larvae in relation to water levels of Upper Klamath Lake in October, at
the time of the annual minimum. The NRC committee did not base its
conclusions solely on water levels in October. The committee considered
relationships between abundance of larvae and water level in various
months and combinations of months. For example, Figure 1 shows the
relative abundance of larvae in relation to water level during the months
when larvae are most abundant for the years over which larvae have been
collected by standardized methods. The committee considered plots such as
the one shown in Figure 1 relevant to the assertion that higher water
levels would produce greater abundances of suckers in Upper Klamath Lake.
Cooperman and Markle do not display plots of this type, although they
extensively discuss the use of such plots by the committee. Evidently,
plots of a presumed dependent variable against a presumed independent
variable carry no significant amount of information from the viewpoint of
Cooperman and Markle. One wonders why the information should be collected
if only one interpretation of it is allowed.
Cooperman and Markle complain about time spans of analysis used by the
committee. Time spans for examination of empirical information vary
because the time spans of data collection vary. Fish kills, for example,
give information on older fish but no information on younger fish.
Systematic larval sampling has been in progress since 1995 but not
earlier; rigorous collection of water quality data began in 1990.
Cooperman and Markle indicate that the committee either was confused or
was manipulating time spans in order to reach preferred conclusions.
Neither is correct; the committee was dealing with a variety of
uncoordinated data sets.
Cooperman and Markle suggest that the NRC committee disregarded data on
juveniles because the data were not consistent with some preconceived
notions that the committee had about water levels. Figure 2 shows
information on the abundance of juveniles in relation to water levels in
June. As evident from Figure 2, and contrary to the implication of
Cooperman and Markle (who cite specific years rather than graphing data),
there is no hint of a relationship between the abundance of juveniles and
water level in June (or other months). Contrary to the claim by Cooperman
and Markle, the committee did not "dismiss" data on juveniles; it merely
indicated a concern about uniformity and success of capture for the
increasingly mobile juveniles, as has the USFWS (2002:30).
Cooperman and Markle characterize the NRC committee’s conclusions with
regard to lake management as confusing in referencing both the mean and
the minimum water levels in Upper Klamath Lake for various hydrologic
categories of years. The agencies, however, seem to have understood the
committee’s conclusions (USBOR 2002; USFWS 2002). The committee mentioned
both minimum and mean water levels because it did not want to be
misconstrued as finding support for the use of operating plans that would
preserve a given minimum while going to more extreme means or preserve
given means while going to more extreme minima. Most important, and clear
from conclusions given in the Interim Report, is that the committee was
not recommending water levels but rather concluding that proposals to
change water levels in either direction with respect to recent historical
operating practices would not be supportable by way of scientific
evidence. The committee did not prescribe water levels; it evaluated
changes in water levels proposed by the agencies.
In their concluding remarks, Cooperman and Markle note that the NRC
committee should have produced "alternative interpretations" rather than
making an evaluation of the scientific validity of the proposals for
management of the Klamath Project. As Cooperman and Markle surely must
know, the requirement to judge the scientific underpinning of the
proposals is given in the committee’s task.
Furthermore, science could not progress without the constant evaluation
of validity for hypotheses; this source of scientific rigor cannot be
displaced by assertions to the effect that "alternative explanations" are
possible for hypotheses that fail to pass empirical tests
.Cooperman and Markle are critical of a conclusion that the NRC
committee made concerning Clear Lake, which contains endangered suckers.
Cooperman and Markle fail to take into account the great morphometric and
hydraulic differences between Clear Lake and Upper Klamath Lake. Upper
Klamath Lake has a characteristic hydraulic residence time of
approximately six months, whereas Clear Lake has a characteristic
hydraulic residence time of well over a year. Thus, an interannual
evaporation buffer is needed for Clear Lake but not for Upper Klamath
Lake.This distinction should have been evident from the USFWS Biological
Opinion of 2001.
Conclusion: Cooperman and Markle, in grasping at every item in
the NRC committee’s report that could be perceived or portrayed as an
error, and in casting doubt on the committee’s competenceand even its
honesty, have shown that their main purpose is to discredit the committee
rather than to deal in a useful way with some of the important issues that
the committee’s report has highlighted. A strictly scientific approach to
the evaluation of information can be disturbing when it contradicts
conventional wisdom or long-held assumptions.
Thus, from the viewpoint of public relations, the application of
scientific methods to problem solving can be disruptive of the peace over
the short term. Over the long term, however, a scientific approach to
problems such as those that appearin the Klamath basin ultimately is the
only reliable way of focusing remedial actions where they will be most
effective rather than where they are most popular or most convenient. In
this way the application of science to environmental problem solving works
toward maintaining the credibility of environmental restoration or
remediation, as necessary in the long run for public support of activities
such as those carried out under the Endangered Species Act.
suckers: Annual survey of abundance and distribution of age 0
shortnose and Lost River suckers in Upper Klamath Lake. Annual report:
2000. Oregon Cooperative Research Unit. Department of Fisheries and
Wildlife, Corvallis.
William M. Lewis, Jr.
Lewis is chair of the National Research Council’s Committee on
Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin. He is a
professor and director of the Center for Limnology, University of
Colorado, Boulder.
Literature Cited
Cooperman M. and Markle. D. F. 2003.
The Endangered Species Act and the National Research Council’s
interim judgment in Klamath Basin. Fisheries 28(3):10-19.
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Interim
Report from the Committee on
Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River
Basin: scientific evaluation of Biological Opinions on endangered and
threatened fishes in the Klamath River Basin. February 2002. National
Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
Simon, D. C. 2002. Preliminary data analysis: annual survey of
abundance and distribution of age 0 shortnose and Lost River suckers in
Upper Klamath Lake. Annual report: 2002. Oregon Cooperative Research Unit.
Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Corvallis.
Simon, D. C., and D. F. Markle. 2001. Ecology of Upper Klamath Lake
shortnose and Lost River suckers.
Annual survey of abundance and
distribution of age 0 shortnose and Lost River suckers in Upper
Klamath Lake. Annual report: 2000. Oregon Cooperative Research Unit.
Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, Corvallis.
USBOR (U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation).
2001. Biological Assessment of the Klamath Project’s continuing
operations on southern Oregon/northern California ESU coho salmon and
critical habitat for southern Oregon/northern California ESU coho salmon.
Mid-Pacific Region. Klamath Basin Area Office, OR _____. 2002. Final
Biological Assessment: the effects of proposed actions related to Klamath
Project operation (April 1, 2002–March 31, 2012) on federally-listed
threatened and endangered species. Mid-Pacific Region. Klamath Basin Area
Office, OR.
USFWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service). 2001.
Biological/Conference Opinion regarding the effects of operation of the
Bureau of Reclamation’s Klamath Project on the endangered Lost River
sucker (Deltistes luxatus), endangered shortnose sucker (Chasmistes
brevirostris), threatened bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus),
and proposed critical habitat for the Lost River/shortnose suckers.
Klamath Falls Fish and Wildlife Office, Klamath Falls, OR. _____. 2002.
Biological/Conference Opinion regarding the effects of operation of the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s proposed 10-year operation plan for the
Klamath Project and its effect on the endangered Lost River sucker (Deltistes
luxatus), endangered shortnose sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris),
threatened bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus), and proposed
critical habitat for the Lost River and shortnose suckers. Klamath Falls
Fish and Wildlife Office. Klamath Falls, OR.
Welch, E.B., and T. Burke. 2001. Interim summary report:
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Lake, Oregon.
Prepared by R2 Resource Consultants,
Inc., Redmond, WA, for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Portland, OR.
23 March 2001. Fisheries recognizes the controversial nature of the
issue discussed here but, at the same time, encourages frank and
considered exchange of views. The AFS does not take a position on this
matter.